Wildlife management on communal land in Namibia by Forslund, Johanna
 
 
 
 
 
Wildlife Management  
on Communal Land  
in Namibia  
‐An Economic Approach 
 
 
Johanna Forslund 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
SLU, Department of Economics               Thesis 490  
Degree Thesis in Economics          Uppsala, 2007              
D-level, 30 ECTS credits 
 
ISSN 1401-4084 
ISRN SLU-EKON-EX-No490--SE 
 
        
iiii i
  
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 ii 
 
 
  
Wildlife Management on Communal Land in Namibia 
‐An Economic Approach 
 
 
 
Förvaltning av vilda djur på kommunal mark i Nambia 
‐Ett nationalekonomiskt angreppssätt  
 
 
Johanna Forslund 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
Supervisor: Clas Eriksson 
 
 iii 
 
 
  
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
© Johanna Forslund 
 
Sveriges lantbruksuniversitet 
Institutionen för ekonomi 
Box 7013 
750 07  UPPSALA 
 
ISSN 1401-4084 
ISRN SLU-EKON-EX-No.490 –SE 
 
Tryck: SLU, Institutionen för ekonomi, Uppsala, 2007 
 iv 
 
 
 Acknowledgements  
 
The author would like to thank Clas Eriksson at the Department of Economics at the Swedish 
University of Agricultural Sciences, Uppsala, for most helpful suggestions and valuable 
comments. Additional thanks to Jonathan Barnes and the Directorate of Environmental 
Affairs at the Ministry of Environment and Tourism,Windhoek, for significant support, desk 
space and help in providing information during my stay in Namibia. Special thanks to 
Wereldsend Environmental Centre for valuable assistance during my fieldtrip, and to Hellen 
Amupolo for brilliant touring company. Thanks also to Therese Lager for useful comments 
and suggestions. Finally, the financial support from SIDAs Minor Field Study is gratefully 
acknowledged.  
 
 v 
 
 
 Abstract 
 
In this paper the anti-poaching effects achieved under the actual implementation of the 
economically-based system for management and utilization of wildlife (Community Based 
Natural Resource Management, CBNRM) initiated in Namibia in 1995, is theoretically 
contrasted to the intended policy design. By contrasting a Nash equilibrium, where the park 
agency and the local community act like competitors rather than companions, to a collusive 
equilibrium, where the two actors work together as a united entity, more local anti-poaching 
activities is found in the latter case. Negative externalities, such as illegal hunting, could be 
understood as better internalized and, thus, a more preferable economically-based system for 
the management and utilization of wildlife appears. Despite great success in terms of 
increased wildlife number following the economic incentive approach, the model implications 
suggest conservation incentives to be even better realized if the implemented CBNRM policy 
in Namibia could re-establish the intended policy design. That is not to be understood as 
criticim of the approach as such. Rather it should be viewd as a contribution for further 
development and success. 
 
 
 
  
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
Key terms: Wildlife management, Common Property Resource Management, Collective 
Property Rights, Economic incentives, Human-Wildlife Conflicts (HWC) 
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 Sammanfattning  
 
År 1995 implementerades ett nytt program i Namibia med det överordnade syftet att på lokal 
nivå skapa förutsättningar för bevarande och förvaltning av vilda djur på statligt ägd mark 
(communal land). Systemet kallas för CBNRM och är förkortning av engelskans  
Community Based Natural Resource Management. Programidén vilar i hög utsträckning på 
teorin om att kollektiva äganderätter och ekonomiska incitament kan användas för att 
uppmuntra människor att bevara vilda djur. Med andra ord, ett system som direkt eller 
indirekt genererar ekonomisk kompensation till de människor som bär kostnaderna för att leva 
i djurrika områden (exempelvis i form skadegörelse), kan verka mildrande på så kallade 
människa-djur konflikter. 
 
I den här studien görs en teoretisk jämförelse avseende effekterna av jaktbrottsmotverkande 
åtgärder mellan, å ena sidan, den faktiska utformningen av CBNRM-programmet och, å andra 
sidan, det ursprungliga CBNRM-förslaget. Genom att använda en modell bestående av två 
aktörer: (i) en stalig och (ii) en lokal, där den förra styr över jaktkvoter och jakttillstånd, och 
den senare ansvarar för jaktbrottsmotverkande åtgärder, kan en jämförelse avseende 
effekterna av jaktmotverkande åtgärder under två olika jämvikter göras. I studien jämförs en 
Nash-jämvikt, där den statliga aktören och den lokala aktören agerar som konkurrenter istället 
för kompanjoner (programmets faktiska utformning), med en avtalad jämvikt (Collusive 
Equlibrium) där de två aktörerna samarbetar (programförslaget). Teoretiskt visar studien att 
mer jaktbrottsmotverkande åtgärder genereras i det alternativ där samarbete äger rum. 
Negativa externa effekter, så som illgal jakt, kan alltså förstås som mer internaliserade i det 
senare fallet.  
 
Trots att CBNRM-programmets faktiska utformning är att förstå som en stor succé i termer av 
jaktbrottsmotverkande åtgärder och ökat antal vilda djur, visar studien att en utformning mer i 
linje med det bakomliggande förslaget skulle kunna generera än bättre resultat. Det är 
emellertid viktigt att påminna sig om att CBNRM-programmet är under ständig utveckling. 
Därför skall studiens resultat inte förstås som kritik mot system som sådant, utan istället som 
ett underlag för fortsatt framgång.  
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
Nyckelord: Förvaltning av vilda djur, Kollektiva äganderättssystem, Ekonomiska incitament, 
Människa-Djur konflikter
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 1  Introduction 
 
Influenced by common property resource management theory1 and feature stories from 
neighboring countries2, an economically-based system for the management and utilization of 
wildlife was implemented in Namibia in 1995. This was formally done through the 
ntroduction of the Community Based Natural Resource Management (CBNRM) policy and 
legislation, ultimately allowing people residing on communal land to benefit from wildlife 
according to the same legal principles as freehold farmers. Despite sound policy planning, a 
policy-implementation is also a result of negotiation, lobbying and log rolling among groups 
with various agendas. From a natural resource conservation perspective the economically-
based system approach has earned good results concerning wildlife numbers. Yet, from an 
economic incentives perspective, the design of an actual policy implementation could be 
relevant for how well people engage with respect to stated policy objectives.  
 
The purpose of this study is threefold; Firstly, to describe the evolution of the common 
property resource management and utilization regime in Namibia. Secondly, make use of 
economic theory to portray the system fundamentals, and thirdly, to theoretically contrast and 
analyze the prevailing system to the original policy intent. The hypothesis is that differences 
between policy intent and implementation disturb management and utilization incentives, 
ultimately affecting conservation efforts in Namibia. 
 
Most previous reference and a related analysis is found in Fisher et al (2005). Focusing on the 
benefit-sharing programme in Zimbabwe3, the authors find that the programme outcomes 
depend on programme design, communal trade-offs between wildlife benefits and agricultural 
losses, and on how hunting licenses are set. The thesis topic also touches upon a literature 
focusing on optimal management of multiuse species, comprising species that are 
simultaneously resources and pests (see Zivin et al (2000); Rondeau (2001); Horan and Bulte 
(2004)). Related, however, with a contrasting point of departure, is the wildlife conservation 
literature under open-access. In Bulte et al (2003) the scope of economic incentives in the 
conservation of wildlife is explored. The authors finds that the conservation gains of 
economic incentives varies between various types of open-access harvesting techniques and 
among species.  
 
The theoretical model applied in this study draws heavily on the model presented by Fisher et 
al (2005). Despite close points of similarities this analysis contributes to the existing literature 
in that it modifies an existing model to better picture the policy and economic realities in 
Namibia. In addition it uses the model framework to contrast the outcomes of a CBNRM 
approach based on a Nash-equilibrium (i.e. policy implementation), to outcomes generated by 
a collusive equilibrium (i.e. policy intent). Valuable information for this study was achieved 
during a SIDA-financed Minor Field Study (MFS) conducted in Nambia during the fall of 
2004.  
 
The essay is structured as follows: After a short country context in section 2, the CBNRM 
evolution is presented in section 3. Section 4 descriptively contrasts the policy intent to its 
actual implementation and relates it to prevailing wildlife use. The model specification is 
                                                          
1 For more on common property resource management see Ostrom (1990) and Murphree (1993). 
2 Similar applied common property management programs in southern Africa are for instance CAMPFIRE in 
Zimbabwe and  ADMADE in Zambia (Corbett & Jones, 2000).  
3 The resource sharing programme in Zimbabwe is called Communal Areas Management Programme For 
Indigenous REsources (CAMPFIRE). For more on CAMPFIRE see Muchapondwa, E (2001). 
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 presented in section 5. In section 6 a Nash equilibrium is constructed to describe the 
prevailing policy implication, subsequently contrasted to a collusive equilibrium offered in 
section 7. The findings are finally stated in the concluding section 8.   
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 2  Country context 
 
Namibia is a large country covering about 830 000 km² of the south-western African coastal 
land surface. The climate is very dry ranging from semi arid in the north east to extremely 
arid on the west coast. Vegetation ranges from savannah woodland in the north east, through 
savannah to desert in the west and south. Rain-fed crop production is therefore limited to very 
small parts of the north and north east. Most land in the country is only suitable for extensive 
grazing by livestock or wildlife, and rangeland carrying capacities are low. Permanent surface 
water is restricted to a few rivers on the northern and southern borders. Neighbouring 
countries are South Africa, Angola, Botswana and Zambia. (Mendelsohn et al, 2003) 
 
Compared to the huge land surface the size of the population is rather small. Of the  
1.7 million citizens, 30 percent live in urban areas. While mining, fishing, and tourism fuel 
the economy, the majority of the people live from subsistence agriculture and what amounts 
to the utilization of natural resources (Stefanova, 2005). The rural economy has two different 
tenure systems where 43 percent of the country – mostly in drier parts – contains private, 
medium scale commercial ranches (Barnes et al, 2001). In the less dry north the communal 
land amounts to 45 percent. Communal land is state owned, but occupied by rural tribal 
communities constituting the majority of the Namibian population. Communities practise 
traditional systems of pastoralism in the south and west, and agro-pastoralism in the north and 
north east. Their access to markets and infrastructure is poor. In the north east, among San 
communities, some sedentary hunting and gathering is practised. 
 
Important wildlife resources occur in less densely settled north western and north eastern 
communal areas. Of conservation importance in the north east are elephants as well as 
buffalo, hippo, sable, roan, lechwe, sitatunga, lion, leopard and wild dog. In the north-west, 
desert adapted wildlife species such as elephant, black rhino, mountain zebra, spring book, 
kudu and oryx occur (Barnes et al, 2001). Attractive scenery of value for tourism exists in 
both places. The number of international tourist arrivals has been steadily increasing over the 
past 15 years (MET, 2004; Stubenrauch Planning Consultants, 2004, cited in Turpie et al, 
2005). Surveys have shown nature-based tourism to be the number one reason for visiting 
Namibia (SIAPAC, 2003, cited in ibid). Thus, sound wildlife- and nature conservation is 
essential for the country’s economic growth.  
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 3  The history of Poaching and the Development of      
CBNRM 
 
In this section relevant institutional background for understanding the development of the 
economically based system in Namibia is provided. The bulk of the information originates 
from Long (2004), comprising analyses from the socio-economic research project Wildlife 
Integration for Livelihood Diversification (WILD) active from 2000 to 2003. Additional 
sources are referred to in the text. 
 
 
3.1 The history of Poaching 
 
Historically, natural resource conservation in Namibia (former South West Africa) focused on 
protected areas, game reserves and wildlife management on commercial farms. Communal 
areas, on the other hand, were distanced from regulatory policies. As of 1967 the Nature 
Conservation Ordinance was implemented allowing private farmers to utilise game in a 
controlled manner. That is, farmers on freehold land were allowed to hunt, sell, capture and 
relocate wildlife according to their own economic interests. This approach subsequently led to 
a substantial increase in wildlife numbers on the freehold farms. According to Barnes and de 
Jager (1996) the total wildlife numbers on freehold land showed an 80 percent increase 
between 1972 and 1992. On the communal land, on the other hand, wildlife numbers were 
declining.  
 
During the former wildlife management panacea wildlife use in the communal areas was 
regulated in the sense that permits to hunt, i.e. legal harvest, were issued by authorities in 
South West Africa (now South Africa). Locals’ hunting for subsistence and for limited sale 
hardly ever had a permit, and their hunt was, thus, regarded illegal (Owen-Smith, 2002). 
Wildlife use among local people was – and often still is – rooted in the culture, providing 
food, income and status as well as medicinal items. Instead of centrally regulated and issued 
permits, hunting activities were, more or less, controlled by influential traditional leaders and 
informal rules. Despite “illegal” subsistence hunting, it was not until the Angola war in the 
mid 1970s, that the significant changes in the wildlife stock on communal lands were 
observed. The wildlife stock dropped from estimated 160 000 to 15 000. Most targeted were 
charismatic species such as elephant, rhino and zebra. The devastating change was to a large 
extent explained by the utilization of firearms, brought in both by Angolans for purchasing 
reasons (i.e. skins and ivory) and by South African Defense Force (SADF), for defense 
reasons. Beginning of the 1980s one single researcher recorded 120 elephant cadaver, 
primarily shot and with tusks removed (Owen-Smith, 2002). Throughout the western area of 
Kunene  
(north-western Namibia), elephant numbers decreased from 300 in 1970 to less than 70 in 
1982. 
 
The serious damage, both in regard to wildlife conservation and the socio-economic 
development within the communal areas in Namibia, was not emphasized until the Namibian 
independence from South Africa in 1990. Pioneering ideas and refreshed rhetoric finally 
boosted an authorial shift away from resource management, led by the heavy hand of the 
state, to a cooperation between the local (i.e. communities represented by NGO’s) and the 
revitalized central level (i.e. Ministry of Environment and Tourism, MET). Of significant 
importance for local involvement in conservation efforts in Namibia was the establishment of 
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 the Namibia Wildlife Trust (NWT)4. With the main objective to bring poaching to an end the 
NGO in collaboration with communal leaders initiated the Community Game Guard 
Programme (CGG). In practice local guards were part-timers patrolling their areas at least 
once a month (Jones, 1999). Their primary purpose was, however, not to detain poachers, but 
to monitor wildlife and suspicious activities. The guards subsequently reported to the 
headmen who would decide upon appropriate measures. In the case of a serious poaching 
incident, the headmen would hand over the case to the responsible government agency. Based 
on an anti-poaching agenda, the CGG enhanced local conservation involvement, and the 
illegal hunting in the area was close to eliminated. 
 
 
3.2 The development of CBNRM 
 
Influenced by common property resource management theory and feature stories from 
neighboring countries such as Zimbabwe and South Africa, an economically-based system for 
the management and utilization paved the way for the implementation of the CBNRM policy 
and legislation.  
 
Community Based Natural Resource Management, CBNRM, is defined in Jones (1996) as 
“something that takes place where a specific group of people have clearly defined rights over 
a resource and collectively take decisions over the use and management of the resource. By 
implication this defined group of people are able to retain any financial benefits that might 
accrue from the use of the resource and are able to decide how they will use the benefits”  
(p. 3).5 The CBNRM policy and legislation6 was approved by the Namibian Cabinet in March 
1995. From then on the residents of communal areas are entitled– in the same manner as 
freeholds farmers – to form a common property resource management institution called a 
‘conservancy’ (Corbett & Jones, 2000).7 A conservancy on communal land can be defined as 
“a community or group of communities within a defined geographical area who jointly 
manage, conserve and utilise the wildlife and other natural resources within the defined area” 
(Jones, 1995). Ultimately the formation of conservancies allows the residents to have these 
registered and hence, acquire from the state (i.e. MET), exclusive use rights over game and 
commercial tourism within a defined area. The conservancy boundaries will have to be 
negotiated and agreed upon with neighboring communities and conservancies. Additionally, a 
conservancy committee representing the people (i.e. members) residing the conservancy must 
be established. The committee must include a traditional leader to uphold linkages and 
collaboration with traditional authorities. In that way the conservancies will have a 
constitution and legal status and so be considered as a corporate body that can sue or be sued. 
The selection of members is generally left to the community itself. A conservancy, no matter 
if it is located in a private or communal area, can then be managed as a unit and the 
landowner/members of the conservancy can share the benefits or returns produced from their 
                                                          
4 Namibia Wildlife Trust (NWT) is a non governmental organization (NGO) established in 1981. For brief 
history and more on the organizational work and efforts see Owen-Smith (2002). 
5 The CBNRM policy design draws heavily on common property resource management theory (See Ostrom 
(1990). 
6 For a more comprehensive overview of what is stated in i) the policy document and ii) the legislation, see 
Appendix 2 and 3. 
7 As concluded by Murphree & Metcalfe (1997) the concervancy concept must be understood and analysed in 
the light of the prevailing policy and legislative setting. A conservancy is a management institution. That is, 
depending the policy design and implementation a conservancy can differ both between and within counties, 
Hence, from now on the conservancy model – as designed and implemented in Nambia – will be referred to as 
the CBNRM policy and legislation and/or the CBNRM approach. 
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 joint efforts. Table 1 provides descriptive statistics on current registered conservancies. As 
shown the biomes, woodland, desert, and savanna, are all represented in the conservancy 
fauna. The number of total registered members per km² varies from 0,02 to 17,4, implying 
concervancy differentiation both in regard to number of registered members, and acreage. In 
addition the percent of registered members of total area population varies from 1 to 50. The 
immense difference between the share of registered members of area population among the 
conservancies has boosted an already on-going discussion in Namibia on whether the 
registration procedure should remain or not. To prevent exclusion and discrimination 
opponents to current procedure hold that residents in a conservancy area automatically should 
be regarded as members. Proponents, on the other hand, see the registration procedure as the 
foundation upon which collective property rights and economic incentives rest. That is, 
without active engagement and possibility to exclude, economic incentive regimes becomes 
somewhat flawed. Furthermore, the Table 1 shows that the first four conservancies were 
registered in 1998. In 2003 the conservancies covered about 7.1 million hectares amounting to 
28 percent of the communal land in Namibia. In late 2004 (not shown in the table) about 31 
conservancies were up and running.  
 
       Table 1  Registered communal area conservancies 
 Source: MET/CSD (2003) cited in Long (2004)  
 Name Region Biome Date 
Registered 
Total 
registered 
members 
per km² 
Percent 
registered 
members 
of area 
population   
1 Nyae Nyae Otjondjupa Woodland Feb -98 0,08 50 
2 Salambala Caprivi Woodland Jun -98 3,76 50 
3 Torra Kunene Desert Jun -98 0,13 38 
4 Khoadi //Hôas Kunene Desert/Savanna Jun -98 0,48 46 
5 
Uibasen-
Twyfelfontein Kunene Desert/Savanna Dec -99 0,21 31 
6 Doro!Nawas Kunene Desert/Savanna  0,11 7 
7 Kwandu Caprivi Woodland Dec -99 9,47 30 
8 Mayuni Caprivi Woodland Dec -99 - - 
9 Wapuro Caprivi Woodland Dec -99 11,49 40 
10 Purros Kunene Desert May -00 0,02 33 
11 Tsiseb Erongo Desert Jan -01 0,12 38 
12 Ehirovipuka Kunene Savanna Jan -01 0,25 - 
13 Marienflüss Kunene Desert Jan -01 0,04 40 
14 Oskop Hardap Shrub/Savanna Feb -01 0,21 17 
15 Sorris Sorris Erongo Desert/Savanna Oct -01 0,13 48 
16 Mashi Caprivi Woodland Mar -03 2,42 18 
17 Omatendeka Kunene Savanna Mar -03 0,23 5 
18 Otjimboyo Erongo Desert/Savanna Mar -03 0,33 5 
19 Uukwaluudhi Omushati Savanna Mar -03 17,40 83 
20 
!Khob-!Naub 
(Kalk Plateau) Hardap Shrub/Savanna Jul -03 0,16 3 
21 //Gamaseb Karas Shrub/Savanna Jul -03 0,28 4 
22 //Huab Kunene Desert/Savanna Jul -03 0,20 4 
23 Orupembe Kunene Desert Jul -03 0,04 1 
24 Sanitatas Kunene Desert Jul -03 0,05 - 
25 Anabeb Kunene Savanna Jul -03 0,21 5 
26 Sesfontein Kunene Savanna Jul -03 0,17 6 
27 Okongundumba Kunene Savanna Jul -03 0,40 2 
28 N#a Jaqna Otjozondjupa Woodland Jul -03 0,09 10 
29 Ozondundu Kunene Savanna Jul -03 0,23 1 
Total     0,08 37 163 
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 4  Policy Intent versus Policy Implication and the 
Use of Wildlife 
 
In the creation of good institutions and relevant policies, economics can be used to create 
incentives that could minimize negative external effects on the environment. For these 
incentives to work, however, policy and legislative flaws, potentially increasing the “market 
failures”, need to be addressed. It is important to keep in mind that the CBNRM reality is still 
in its infancy. Hence, discrepancies between policy intent and policy implementation on the 
one hand, and legal provision and policy implementation on the other hand, should be 
understood as challenges rather than problems.  
 
 
4.1 Intent versus Implication 
 
The actual rights given to registered conservancies through the CBNRM policy and 
legislation are the following (Jones 2003 (cited in Long, 2004)):  
 
? Registered conservancies have unlimited rights over species represented on the 
schedule of huntable game. 
? Registered conservancies can enter into a contract with trophy hunting companies and 
earn income by selling the conservancy trophy hunting quota to them. 
? To enable the development of commercial tourism facilities, registered conservancies 
can enter into a contract with tourism companies.  
? Registered conservancies are free to do whatever they like with income earned from 
various contracts. 
? Conditional upon wildlife monitoring, acknowledge of wildlife number and trends, 
registered conservancies can suggest trophy hunting and other quotas to the MET. 
? Individuals within registered conservancies have the right to shoot most problem 
animals if needed. This includes protected and specially protected species. Incidents 
involving specially protected species must be reported to the MET. 
? In time of drought registered conservancies can hinder competition between wildlife 
and livestock by harvesting huntable game. Additionally, permits to remove other 
species can be applied for at the MET. 
? Applications by registered conservancies for other game utilization (e.g. live capture, 
sale of wildlife or other use of protected species) can be made to the MET.  
 
Despite the fast countrywide development of conservancy formations on communal land, the 
policy rhetoric is not always as clear-cut as it seems. For instance the CBNRM-legislation is 
not particularly straight-forward on conservancies’ rights to tourism. The amended legislation 
definition of “non-consumptive utilization over wildlife” tries to acquire rights to 
conservancies to benefit from commercial tourism activities within conservancy boarders. As 
long as concessionary rights over commercial tourism are commonly uphold by private actors 
the legislative intent could, however, be understood as somewhat blurred. Furthermore, the 
policy and legislative framework does not take land-use planning undertaken by the 
conservancies into consideration. Land-use planning is when land within conservancies is 
divided into activity specific zones. Some zones are for wildlife and tourism, whereas other 
are devoted for farming etc (Brereton-Stiles, 2004). From an economic standpoint the zoning 
system could reduce the negative external effect associated with collective good attributes 
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 (i.e. non-excludability and non-rivalty). Yet, the lack of legislative framework leads to 
enforcement flaws, in turn limiting the aim of zoning.  
 
An additional management activity not provided for in the legislation is the community anti-
poaching activities. That is, communities can employ game guards to deter poaching and to 
monitor wildlife. Although community game guards are there to address and curtail illegal 
hunting, they have no mandate in law to do so. 
 
Table 2 presents a comparison between policy intentions, legal provisions and implementation 
of the CBNRM policy and legislation is provided.  
 
Table 2  Policy Intention vs. Legal provision and Implementation 
 
Policy Intention Legal provision  Implementation 
 
Communal area conservancies 
should gain the same rights as 
freehold farmers especially the right 
to use huntable game* for own use 
without permits or restrictions on 
numbers. 
 
Nature Conservation Amendment Act of 
1996 makes provision for communal area 
conservancies to have same rights as 
freehold farmers. 
 
MET officials insist on communal 
area conservancies receiving 
quotas that include huntable 
game for own use and that 
permits must be  
acquired**.  
 
Conservancies expected to develop 
management plans once they have 
been registered. 
 
No legal provision for conservancies to 
develop management plans. 
 
Government officials starting to 
demand a management plan 
before a quota (for trophy 
hunting and own use) will be 
issued. 
 
Conservancies expects to set own 
quotas to be endorsed by MET. 
 
No legal requirement for quotas to be set 
for own use; legal requirement for quotas 
for trophy hunting. 
 
Government officials decide 
quota often arbitrary – in at least 
one case the official quota far 
excided that requested.   
 
Conservancies should receive 
concessionary rights to commercial 
tourism. 
 
Nature Conservation Amendment Act of 
1996 gives weak tourism rights (gives 
rights to ‘non-consumptive’ use of wildlife 
which includes for recreational purposes. 
No relevant tourism legislation.) 
 
Government officials have issued 
new hunting private sector 
concessions where there are 
registered and emerging 
conservancies. 
 
Hunting concessions previously held 
on communal land by private sector 
should be transferred to 
conservancies. 
 
Nature conservation Amendment Act of 
1996 gives conservancies trophy hunting 
rights. 
 
Government officials have issued 
new private business sector 
concessions where there are 
registered and emerging 
conservancies. 
 
Conservancies should be able to 
enter into joint venture partnership 
and other business arrangements 
with private sector. 
 
Policy on Promotion of Community-based 
Tourism of 1995 promotes joint venture 
approaches and aims to create a 
“supportive and enabling legal 
framework”. 
 
Tendency by government to 
interpret policy as giving it the 
right to approve joint venture 
agreement.  
 
Conservancies should take over 
greater role in managing wildlife 
including problem animals. 
 
Nature Conservation Ordinance of 1975 
enables citizen to shoot a predator that 
threatens the lives of people or livestock. 
Shooting of lions has to be reported 
within 24 hours; elephants may only be 
shot by special permits. 
 
Officials recently refused to allow 
a problem lion to be shot by 
trophy hunters in a conservancy 
denying residents compensation 
for stock losses. 
* Huntable game refers to oryx, springbok, kudu, warthog, buffalo and bushpig 8.  
** MET has now acknowledged that quotas and permits are not required for own use of huntable game. 
 Source: Corbett and Jones (2000) 
 
As notified by Corbett and Jones (2000) the information in Table 2 highlights the fact that the 
right to utilize and benefit from wildlife on communal land is both conditional and limited. It 
is conditional in the sense that communities need to form a conservancy in order to legally 
                                                          
8 MET has suggested the latter two to be removed from the schedule of huntabel game (Long, 2004). 
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 obtain the use right, and limited do to that ‘ownership’ over wildlife only confers to a limited 
number of defined species. That is, for any other utilization than of huntable game a permit 
and/or a quota are required from the MET.  
 
 
4.2 The Use of Wildlife 
 
Ideally conservancies increase local responsibility and useright over wildlife. Long et al (2004 
p 8) write: “Not only has there been demonstrable growth in the establishment of 
conservancies, there has also been considerable success in contributing to the recovery of 
wildlife species.” The statement is backed up by wildlife numbers from sightings recorded for 
the Kunene region in north-western Namibia (see Table 3). Although the table shows 
increased sightings for almost all recorded species, national count data would be necessary for 
a more far-reaching conclusion. On the assumption that the table results would be valid for 
the whole Namibia wildlife stock, policy implications for a future conservation perspective 
could be understood as twofold and somewhat contradictive. On the one hand, more wildlife  
is likely to increase the tourism potential. 
Considering the larger part of the total 
conservancy income to be generated from 
community-based tourism enterprises and 
trophy hunting, a frequent occurrence of big 
game such as elephants, rhinos, lions and 
cheetahs is likely to boost conservancy 
benefits. Both consumptive (e.g. trophy 
hunting) and non-consumptive (e.g. viewing 
safaris) value adding are likely to generate 
benefits. On the other hand, increased wildlife 
numbers forces people to compete for scarce 
water and land resources. Economically this 
could mean increased opportunity costs of 
living with wildlife and potentially amplified 
motives for human-wildlife conflicts. 
Table 3  Wildlife sightings recorded for 
Kunene 2001-20039
Species 2001 2002 2003 
Baboon 144 116 203 
Duiker 13 6 3 
Elephant 38 24 44 
Gemsbok 1 589 2 616 3 484 
Giraffe 216 212 189 
Hyena 1   
Jackal 45 79 60 
Klipspringer 4 14 20 
Kudu 261 297 241 
Ortrich 570 659 815 
Rhino 1 1 6 
Springbok 11 662 14 470 16 733 
Steenbok 54 85 114 
Zebra 1 200 1 274 1 416 
Total 15 798 19 853 23 328 
 
The cost of living with wildlife in Namibia involves both direct costs (e.g. stock losses, crop 
and water point damage, deterrent costs, and threat and loss of human lives), and indirect 
costs (e.g. opportunity costs of time and labor, and nuisance of living with wildlife) (see 
Sutton, 2001). In lack of human-wildlife conflict data on the national level, regional data 
serve as example here. Data from the Caprivi region (north-eastern Namibia) in 2001 shows 
bushpig to be the only huntable game reported as causing damage. The most common species 
reported to MET as reason for nuisances was instead elephant (≈230 incidents), hyena (≈210 
incidents), crocodile (≈75 incidents), hippo (≈70 incidents), lion (≈50 incidents) and baboon 
(60 incidents). Between 1996 and 2001 the total number of reported incidents involving 
damage to crops by wildlife in Caprivi amounted to 384. Approximately 75 percent of the 
incidents were caused by elephants. From a household survey in Kunene elephants were 
reported to represent 81 percent of the species causing damage to gardens (Suich, 2003, cited 
in Long et al 2004). Other problem species in regard to damage to crop and gardens are 
warthog, monkeys, porcupine, springhare, antelopes, baboon, hippo and birds.  
                                                          
9 The table is collected from Long (2004) who refers to Annual game count data from the NASCO NRM 
working group. 
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In regard to livestock predation, MET data from Caprivi for the same period involved 246 
predator incidents. Lions counted for 64 percent of the reported incidents involving stock 
death, crocodiles for 20 percent, and hyenas for 11 percent. In Kunene the black jackal are 
reviewed as posing the greatest threat to livestock.  
 
One conclusion to be drawn from the above presented data is that, the most frequently 
reported species are protected or specially protected species according to national and 
international treaties. Hence hunting is restricted. That is, to “use” protected or specially 
protected species applications to the MET must be made. Furthermore, to enable trophy 
hunting on communal land, the conservancy must be registered as a hunting farm. 
 
Despite prevailing human wildlife conflicts, the conservancy legislation rests upon the belief 
that engaged and empowered people can manage resources sustainably, as long as the 
generated benefits exceed the costs. In other words, with the right incentives the local 
community is believed to “protect what is theirs”. If that implies to agricultural activities or 
wildlife conservation is, thus, a relevant policy consideration.  
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 5  Model specification 
 
As mentioned in the introductory section, the theoretical model applied here draws heavily on 
the model presented in Fisher et al (2005). The following model section uses economic 
terminology to describe the prevailing resource management and utilization principles in 
Namibia. The model framework subsequently allows economic incentive outcomes under the 
policy implementation to be contrasted to the policy intent.  
 
To capture the interaction between a local and a central level the model comprises two agents; 
a park agency and a local community10. The park agency sets the hunting quotas and offers 
hunting permits, while the local community controls (for) anti-poaching activities. Both 
agents generate economic benefits from wildlife. Benefits accrue from tourism involving both 
consumptive wildlife use (e.g. trophy hunting) and non-consumptive wildlife use (e.g. 
viewing safaris). The park agency primarily collects revenue through trophy hunting permit 
fees and game parks entrance fees. The community generates economic benefits from wildlife 
through joint ventures with private entrepreneurs or community campsites. As opposed to the 
park agency, the community also generates benefits from agriculture, forming a trade-off 
situation between wildlife conservation and agricultural production.  
 
The two agents in the model are set with a fixed amount of land. In Namibia each square 
kilometer is populated by an average of just over two people. However, the diverse 
availability of natural resources cause an unevenly population spread (Mendelsohn et al 
2003). Population clusters are primarily found around sites with favorable environmental 
conditions. Not surprisingly, the same goes for wildlife. Despite the 14 percent of the state 
protected land, wildlife roam in and out of national parks, not rarely causing nuances to 
adjacent people. Subsequent to the CBNRM policy and legislation the park agency should no 
longer generate economic benefits from hunting permit fees on communal land. Thus, some 
economic revenues will be transferred from the state to specific communities on communal 
land. In the model the issuing of hunting quotas and permits to a community implies giving 
the locals “a share of” hunting profits captured by the α . Further, the share of benefits 
generated by non-consumptive tourism is expressed by β . Assuming the profit shares to be 
fixed over time and to satisfy 0 1α≤ ≤  and 0 1β≤ ≤ , the remaining benefits accrue to the 
park agency.  
 
To delimit misunderstandings and confusions on how the parameters α  and β   
are to be interpreted, a short clarification is worthwhile. In reality the “benefit-shares” are not 
limited to a revenue share between resource authorities and communities adjacent to national 
parks (e.g. “park and neighbor” or co-management approaches). More specifically, α  and β  
refer to a wider interpretation of benefit-sharing, involving community-based power and 
control, defined rights, and collective decision over the use and management of the resources 
at hand. That is, after a conservancy is registered it is up to the conservancy itself to manage 
its resources within the limits of the national law (Jones, 1996).  
 
 
 
                                                          
10 Throughout the model section the expressions local community, registered conservancy and specific 
community are used inter-changeably.  
 11 
 
 
 5.1 The wildlife constraint  
 
In the model presented here all wildlife is regarded as one entity, ignoring the wildlife 
divergences across various species. No account is taken to wildlife stock growth; hence, the 
initial wildlife stock is taken as given and is expressed as W . To control stock size the control 
variables H  and  are applied. The former, Q H , represents legal hunting/harvest of wildlife, 
i.e. permitted trophy hunting, own-use hunting and problem animal harvesting. The latter, Q , 
is the quantity of poaching, i.e. all hunting performed without permission. Irrespectively of 
the historic or prevailing resource management panacea in Namibia, the net wildlife stock is 
expressed as the gross stock minus legal and illegal hunting activities: 
  
W W H Q= − −  (1) 
  
The circumstances and motives to engage in illegal hunting are, however, expected to vary 
between different management schemes. That is, the functions H  and Q  are likely to depend 
on the various built-in incentives in the resource management regime.  
  
 
5.2 Poaching 
 
As mentioned earlier poaching skyrocketed in the 1970s. The devastating big game losses 
were primarily caused by foreign intruders equipped with firearms (Owen-Smith, 2002). 
Today few people residing communal land have own access to weapons required for big game 
hunt (Brereton-Stiles, 2004). That is, the greater part of present poaching activities among 
locals refers primarily to small-scale subsistence hunting of relatively less relevance for 
conservation management. Furthermore, early collaborative anti-poaching efforts, such as  
introduction of community game guards, boosted a willingness among locals to protect 
“their” wildlife, ultimately affecting poaching engagement negatively. 
 
Hence, based on historic examples, the model relies on the assumption that i) big-scale 
poaching in Namibia is primarily organized and mannered by outsiders,  and that ii) policy 
instruments could be applied to motivate locals to combat illegal hunting.  This analysis 
should derive a poacher’s decision to engage in illegal hunting from an optimization problem, 
where a function comprising control variables for benefits and costs obtained from the 
activities, is maximized. To address the focal point in this paper, i.e. a community’s incentive 
to combat or collaborate with conservation efforts provided by the CBNRM approach, the 
poacher’s optimization is subsumed in a behavioral function. The total quantity of illegally 
hunted wildlife is expressed as a function of anti-poaching activities, A , such that
    
  
( )Q Q A=   (2)  
 
As illustrated in Figure 1, it is assumed that  ( ) 0Q A′ <  and ( ) 0Q A′′ > . Hence, the higher the 
A , the lower the level of poaching activities. If, however, policy instruments are ineffective 
or insufficient A  could be negative, implying that some people from the community are 
cooperating with the poachers. 
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Figure 1  The quantity of poached wildlife depends on anti-poaching activities. 
 
Allowing the quantity of illegal hunting to be set by the level of anti-poaching engagement, an 
explanation of how the community chooses the level of A  is still required. This will be 
further explored in section 5.4. 
 
 
5.3 Park Agency 
 
5.3.1 Objective Function and First Order Condition 
 
While the implementation of the CBNRM policy and legislation provides use rights over 
wildlife to specific communities, the MET can be understood as having the legal 
responsibility for the nation’s wildlife. In the model the MET is represented by the park 
agency. In reality the commercial wildlife sector involves more agents than the two 
represented in the model. However, considering the MET as the overall commander over 
hunting concessions and concessionary rights to commercial tourism, additional operators 
such as private businesses are included in the park agency. Understanding private businesses 
and park agency as one body also explains why the park agency will be modeled as a profit 
maximizer although some hunting permits are, more or less, freely transferred from the state 
to the communities on communal land.  
 
The park agency gains revenues through hunting permit fees generated from operations on 
hunting concessions. In the model the park agency revenue, , comprises the price of a 
permit, , and the total number of issued hunting permits, 
pH
p H . The permit price is assumed to 
be fixed. This is a valid hypothesis considering the high number of registered hunting 
operators in Namibia. In 2004 trophy hunting was permitted on approximately 500 registered 
hunting farms (Damm, 2005). Additionally, several countries in eastern and southern Africa 
compete within the hunting tourism sector, further strengthening the price-taker assumption 
(Fisher et al, 2005).  
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 Parallel to revenue from consumptive hunting activities, the park agency also benefits from 
non-consumptive tourism, e.g. parks entrance fees.11 As illustrated in Figure 2 the non-
consumptive gains in the model is expressed as a function of the wildlife stock, . 
Revenues are assumed to be increasing with the wildlife stock at a decreasing rate, i.e. 
 and 
( )T W
( ) 0T W′ > ( ) 0T W′′ < . The assumption is valid since limited possibilities to accommodate 
tourists, parks limited carrying capacity etc rule out the wildlife tourism revenues to increase 
at the same rate as the wildlife stock.  
 
 
 
  )(WT
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
  
  W
Figure 2  The revenues increase with the wildlife stock at a decreasing rate. 
 
The CBNRM policy and legislation provides for community residents to form conservancies 
and have them registered as commercial tourism concessions and/or hunting concessions that 
enable trophy hunting on communal land. In practice this means a transfer of wildlife revenue 
from the park agency to the community agent. Hence, the issuing of hunting quotas and 
permits to specific communities ultimately implies giving the conservancy members a share 
of hunting profits. In the model this share is represented by α .  
 
Analogously to the hunting “benefit-sharing” argument, revenues generated by the exclusive 
use rights over game for commercial tourism, provided by the CBNRM policy and legislation, 
is expressed by β .  
 
In sum, by allocating quotas and permits for trophy hunting and non-consumptive use rights 
of wildlife for recreational purposes (i.e. tourism) on communal land, the park agency gives 
the share α  of , and a share pH β  of  to the local community. The remaining benefits 
accrue the park agency. Using equations (1) and (2) the remaining sum of profit is expressed 
as, 
( )T W
 
(1 ) (1 ) ( ( ))p H T W H Q Aα β∏ = − + − − −  (3) 
 
                                                          
11 Understanding private businesses and park agency as one body “parks” refers both to national parks as well as 
private game parks or likewise. 
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 There are two endogenous variables in this model: H  and A . The park agency takes A  as 
given, whereas H  is chosen optimally. Equation (3) reveals a trade-off situation for the park 
agency between the two sources of revenue. A higher H  increases  but decreases .  pH ( )T W
 
The park agency maximizes profit with respect to H  such that 
 
(1 ) (1 ) ( ( ))p W Hα β ′− = − − −Q A   (4)  
 
Notably, for an increase in issued hunting quotas and permits, H , the park agency reduces 
revenues from tourism as the wildlife stock decreases. Condition (4) implicitly defines the 
park agency’s reaction function, which can be expressed as  
 
 ( )pH R A=    (5)   
 
For any chosen A  by the local community, the reaction function (5) expresses the park 
agency’s optimal choice of H . To develop a further understanding of this function, the slope 
is first determined, and thereafter an examination of potential shifts caused by changes in the 
exogenous parameters will follow.  
 
5.3.2 Slope of the Reaction Curve 
 
Figure 3 depicts the two terms comprised in Equation (4). As shown, the park agency profit 
maximizing hunting  occurs where the marginal revenues from hunting quotas and permits 
(i.e. the left side of Equation (4)) are equal to the marginal revenues generated from tourism 
activities (i.e. the right side of Equation (4)).  
*H
 
 
 
 
      
 
(1 ) ( ( ))T W H Q Aβ ′− − −                
 
 
 
                                                                                                          (1 )p α−  
 
 
 
 
 
 
                                                                                                 *H H  
Figure 3 To maximize profit the park agency will set the legal hunting at . *H
 
To strengthen the understanding of a positively sloped T ′  it is advisable to first note that the 
assumption of T  means that T  declines as its argument grows. Analogously,  grows 0′′ < ′ T ′
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 as its argument shrinks. Now, consider an increase in H . This would cause the argument of 
 to decline, and so it can be argued that the higher values of T ′ H , the higher values of T ′ . 
 
Next, consider an increase in A . The immediate effect is that Q  falls. As a consequence the 
argument of T  increases, implying a lower T′ ′  value for every H . As illustrated in Figure 4 
the curve shifts down, generating a higher optimal H , . **H
 
 
 
                                                                                                     
*(1 ) ( ( ))T W H Q Aβ ′− − −  
 
                                                                                                            
**(1 ) ( ( ))T W H Q Aβ ′− − −  
 
 
                    
                                                                                                             (1 )p α−  
 
 
                                                                                 
 
 
 
                                                                                                   *H **H H  
Figure 4  An increase in anti poaching activities lead the park agency to increase the level of issued permits 
and quotas.  
 
Based on the above argumentation a higher A  leads to a higher optimal H  for the park 
agency. Thus, the positively sloped reaction function (5) is now determined and illustrated in 
Figure 5.  
 
 
 
                                                         H                                                            
                                                                                                               ( )pR A   
 
                                                                                                               
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
                   
               A  
Figure 5  The park agency response given the community anti-poaching actions.  
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The interpretation of the above findings goes as follows: As communities raise their efforts to 
combat illegal hunting, A , the park agency meets a larger wildlife population without facing 
any costs. The marginal revenues from tourism then fall ( ( ) 0T W′ < ). Hence, from the park 
agency perspective revenue rendering from consumptive wildlife use (i.e. trophy hunting 
permit fees) becomes relatively more attractive than revenue from non-consumptive wildlife 
use (i.e. park entrance fees).  
 
5.3.3 Shifts in the Reaction Curve 
 
Having discussed the slope, an examination of potential shifts caused by changes in any of the 
exogenous parameters comes next in turn.  
 
Looking back on Figure 4, one can see how an increase in tourism share, β , initial wildlife 
stock, W , and anti-poaching activities, A , shift of the “tourism-curve” downward. 
Consequently, the park agency increases the level of issued permits and quotas, since hunting 
operations are relatively more “attractive” than tourism activities.   
 
According to Figure 6, however, the rational agency response to a fall in the permit price, , 
and/or an increase in the level of hunting permit share 
p
α , is to offer fever hunting permits. 
 
 
                                                                                                 
                                                                                                      (1 ) ( ( ))T W H Q Aβ ′− − −  
 
 
 
*(1 )p α−  
                                                                                         
                                                                                                             
**(1 )p α−  
     
                                                                                                             
 
 
                                                                                              **H *H H  
 
Figure 6  A drop in permit price, and/or an increase in the level of hunting permits shares, leads the park 
agency to decrease the level of issued permits and quotas. Hence, the wildlife stock is reduced. 
 
Having showed the rational park agency response to changes in variables ultimately affecting, 
H , the implicit function and its variable relations could be summarized as 
  
( )( ) ( ) ( ) ( )
( ; , , , )H H A p Wα β
++ + − +=   (6) 
 
Before turning to the community-agent, it is interesting to note that a drop in price in this 
model, would lead to a relative advantage for the park agency to benefit from tourism 
activities (i.e. non-consumtive use) compared to hunting operations (i.e. consumptive use). On 
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 the other hand, a drop in hunting shares, accompanied by an increase in the wildlife stock, 
increases the conflict between agriculture and wildlife conservation faced by people residing 
on communal land. The community could, thus, have reason to respond by reduced anti-
poaching activities. That in turn could boost illegal hunting activities, Q , and consequently 
affect the wildlife stock negatively.  
 
To enable a further description on conservation incentives in Namibia it is now time to turn 
attention towards the local community. 
 
 
5.4 The Local Community 
 
Before entering into the local community model specifics it is worthwhile notifying that, in 
reality, only part of the communal land residents are registered conservancy members. As the 
model, however, is set with only two agents, i.e. park and local community, the latter are 
interpreted as being representative for all local communities. In the case of Namibia this is a 
valid assumption, as Wildlife Councils are established to manage wildlife for the benefits of 
non-conservancy members (MET, 2005). Despite functional differences, both aim at creating 
economic incentives for wildlife conservation on communal land. 
 
As mentioned in the introductory model section the community generates economic benefits 
both from wildlife and agriculture. Again, the issuing of hunting quotas and permits to a 
community implies giving the locals “a share of” hunting profits, α , and tourism profits, β .  
 
The local community are also faced by costs in terms of wildlife damage to agriculture, and a 
cost for “anti-poaching” activities (e.g. time). A trade-off situation between wildlife 
conservation and agricultural production is thus prevalent.   
 
In the model the community’s revenue from agriculture is expressed as a net revenue, ( )R W , 
where it is assumed that, revenue declines when wildlife increases ( ) 0R W′ <  and .  0R′′ <
 
The cost of anti-poaching activities,  takes the properties shown in ( )C A Figure 7. 
  
 
     )(AC
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
                                                                  
0                               A  
Figure 7 The cost of anti-poaching activities. 
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 The interpretation is that both helping poachers and preventing them is costly.  
 
Accounting for both benefits and costs, the local community’s utility function is expressed as: 
 
( ( )) ( ( ))U R W H Q A pH T W H Q A C Aα β= − − + + − − − ( )  (7) 
 
Analogously to the park agency’s problem of choosing H , the local community takes H  as 
given and maximizes U  with respect to A : 
 
( ) ( ) ( ) ( ) ( ) 0U R W Q A T W Q A C Aβ′ ′ ′ ′ ′ ′= − ⋅ − ⋅ − = ⇔ ( ) ( ) ( ) ( ) ( )C A R W Q A T W Q Aβ′ ′ ′ ′ ′− = + ⋅  (8)  
 
This condition implicitly defines the optimal A  for any given H . That is Equation (8) gives 
the reaction function:  
 
( )LCA R H=   (9) 
 
As in the previous section, a further understanding of this function could be developed 
through determination of the slope and consequences of potential shifts caused by changes in 
the exogenous parameters. Compared to reaction function (5), it is however difficult to obtain 
this information. Thus, a mathematical rather than graphical approach is more suitable. In 
Appendix 3 Equation (8) is totally differentiated to get 
 
1 ( ( ) )dA Q T R dH T Q dβ β′ ′′ ′′ ′ ′= + −Δ  (10)  
 
where   by the second order condition for utility maximization. Equation (10) defines 
the Local Community’s best response of 
0Δ >
A , for a Park Agency change in the variables H  
and β .  
 
The consequences of an increase in β  can now be written as   
 
( ) ( )1 0dA T Q
dβ
+ −− ′ ′= ⋅ >Δ   
 
The interpretation is that a bigger wildlife stock generates more community revenue. This 
implies the community members to have incentives to combat poachers in order to minimize 
the risk of reduced wildlife numbers. 
 
Turning to the slope of the reaction function, the following expression is derived. 
  
( ) ( )
( ) 0dA Q T R
dH
β − −′ ′′ ′′+= >Δ  
 
In Figure 8 this positively sloping curve is depicted. The understanding is that higher level of 
legal harvest infers higher level of anti-poaching activities. As legal harvest increases, the 
community revenue from non-consumtive tourism decreases and, thus, the community is 
motivated to combat illegal hunting to safeguard their utility.  
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Figure 8 The slope of the reaction curve if  0T ′′ <  and 0R′′ < . 
 
 
The knowledge about the reaction function can thus be summarized as 
 
( , )A A H β+ +=  
 
where the effects of β  and H  on A  have been showed to be positive.  
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 6  Nash Equilibrium – An Attempt to Depict 
Actuality 
 
Based on the model specifics presented in the preceding sections, the actual policy 
implementation can now be economically portrayed and subsequently analyzed.  
 
Bringing together the reaction functions  and  a Nash equilibrium can be constructed. 
In such an equilibrium the park agency is set to choose the variable 
(5) (9)
H  strategically based on 
the local community’s choice of A  and vice versa. The gap between the CBNRM policy 
intention and its implementation is, hence, assumed to make park and community act like 
competitors rather than companions. 
 
The Nash equilibrium is illustrated in Figure 9. 
    
                  
                                                    H                                                                     
                                                                     
 
                              pR                                                                           
                                                                                                                    
                                                                                                                                                                     NashH
                                                                                                                       
 
                                                                      LCR                                                                                                  
 
                 
                                                                                               NashA A                                                                   
Figure 9  The Park agency will choose H   where its reaction curve intersects with the local community’s 
reaction curve and vice versa.                                                                            
 
In Figure 10 attention is directed towards an increase in β , i.e. increased revenues from non-
consumptive tourism for the local community ultimately leading the equilibrium to shift from 
 to . That is, both legal hunting and anti-poaching activities are positively affected. The 
interpretation is that as  
1E 2E
β  increases the community accrues higher revenue from non-
consumptive tourism relatively agricultural busines, and, hence, increases its anti-poaching 
activities. The park, on the other hand, faces higher marginal benefits from legal hunting, 
rather than non-consumptive tourism, and increases its issuing of hunting permits.  
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Figure 10   An increase in revenues generated by non-consumptive tourism, leads to an increase both in legal 
off-take and more anti-poaching activities.                                                                                              
 
Assuming the Nash Equilibrium presented here to be picturing the actual CBNRM policy at 
best, the outcomes are not to be regarded as bad. In terms of increased wildlife numbers the 
CBNRM approach is a tremendous success. Yet, from a policy perspective it could still be 
valuable to contrast the findings to an alternative equilibrium to see if a shift from “actuality 
to optimality” can be brought about. 
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 7  Collusive Equilibrium – An Attemt to Depict 
Optimality 
 
To address potential policy and legislative flaws that could boost undesired negative 
externalities such as less anti-poaching activities, the Nash equilibrium from the preceding 
section is here contrasted to a collusive equilibrium. 
 
Contrary to the Nash equilibrium, where the one agent makes choices strategically based on 
the other agent’s choice, a collusive equilibrium can be understood as a union of the park and 
the local community. To capture the implications of the CBNRM policy intent, a new 
objective function is expressed by summarizing the earlier presented equations (3) and (7) 
such that 
 
( ( )) ( ( ))V R W H Q A pH T W H Q A C A= − − + + − − − ( )  
 
The negative externalities at issue in this case, could thus be internalized. In other words, as 
park and local community work together, the local community is potentially more engaged in 
anti poaching activities. To see if this could be the case attention needs to be brought to the 
conservancy “benefit” maximization. 
 
The community maximizes V  with respect to H  and A : 
 
H : ( 1) ( 1) 0 ( ( )) ( ( ))R p T p T W H Q A R W H Q A′ ′ ′ ′⋅ − + + ⋅ − = ⇔ = − − + − −  (11) 
A : 0 ( ) ( ) ( ) ( ) ( )R Q T Q C C A R W Q A T W Q A′ ′ ′ ′ ′ ′ ′ ′ ′ ′− − − = ⇔ − = ⋅ + ⋅  (12) 
 
Now the solution given by the Equations (11) and (12) could be compared to the Equations 
(4) and (8). In other words, the Nash equilibrium is contrasted to a collusive equilibrium 
approach. 
 
A comparison between Equation (8) to (12) reveals that (12) is a special case of Equation (8) 
where β =1. Recall from Equation (8) that A  increases as β  grows. Therefore A  should, for 
any given H , take on a higher value in Equation (12) relatively Equation (8).  As the 
collusive equilibrium case indicates more anti-poaching, negative externalities could be 
understood as better internalized and, thus, an economically more ideal CBNRM approach 
appears.  
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Set out from Figure 8 the following Figure 11 illustrates how a higher A  shifts previously 
presented curves upwards.      
 
                                                                  
 
                                           A                               
                                                                                              ( )LCR H  
 
                                                             1A
                                                                                                                
 
                                                                                                     0A
                                         
                                                                        ( )LCR H                                                               
                                                                                                                                                                           0
                                                                                                 H                                                                         
 
                                                                                                                                      
                                                                                                                                                         
Figure 11  More anti-poaching.activites shifts the reaction curve upwards.   
 
 
The variable H , on the other hand, can take on both higher and lower values. One way to 
interpret this somewhat contradictive information goes as follows:  
 
In a collusive equilibrium, where park and community are both parts of a collective 
proprietorship, the latter feels more involved and hence, has more incentives to combat illegal 
hunting (i.e. more anti-poaching activities). Simultaneously, the park recognizes increased 
wildlife numbers, which in turn allows for more legal off-take. 
 
Assuming α β=  in Equation (4) then 
 
( (p T W H Q A′= − − ))  ( 4′ )  
 
Contrasting Equation ( ) to Equation (10), the latter involves an additional negative term 
compared to the former. That is, 
4′
( )W H  takes on a lower value in Equation ( 4 ). 
Thus, for any given 
Q A− − ′
A  the variable H  is higher in Equation (10) relatively Equation ( 4′ ) (see 
Figure 12).  
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Figure 12  In a collusive equilibrium the park agency reaction curve shifts downwards.                                                         
                                                                                                    
 
Finally, the above presented equilibria can be illustrated to contrast the actual policy intent to 
the prevailing implementation. Figure 13 illustrates how the Nash equilibrium, where park 
and community act like competitors rather than companions, generates less anti-poaching 
activities compared to a collusive equilibrium, where the two actors work together as united 
entity.  
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                                                                     NashE
                                                                                 CollusiveE
 
 
 
 
                                                                                                            A  
Figure 13  Contrasting the equilibriums shows the collusive approach to be more ideal from a wildlife 
conservation perspective. 
 
Based on the above presented findings, the understanding is that as park and community are 
joint proprietors rather than competitors, the community feels more involved and has more 
 25 
 
 
 incentives to engage in anti-poaching. Simultaneously, park recognizes an increased wildlife 
stock making non-consumptive tourism relatively more profitable. 
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 8  Conclusions 
 
In 1995, an economically-based system for the management and utilization of wildlife was 
implemented in Namibia. This was formally done through the introduction of the Community 
Based Natural Resource Management (CBNRM) policy and legislation, ultimately allowing 
people residing on communal land to benefit from wildlife according to the same legal 
principles as freehold farmers.       
 
In accordance with the underlying aim, this thesis uses valuable information achieved during 
a SIDA-financed Minor Field Study (MFS) conducted in Nambia fall 2004, to: Firstly, 
describe the evolution of the common property resource management and utilization regime 
in Namibia. Secondly, make use of economic theory to portray the system fundamentals, and 
thirdly, to theoretically contrast and analyze the prevailing system to the original policy 
intent. 
 
Having done so, the introductory hypothesis, that differences between policy intent and 
implementation can disturb management and utilization incentives, ultimately affecting 
conservation efforts in Namibia, can not be rejected.  
 
By contrasting a Nash equilibrium, where park and community act like competitors rather 
than companions, to a collusive equilibrium, where the two actors work together as a united 
entity, the model reveals both more anti-poaching and less legal hunting in the latter case. As 
higher levels of anti-poaching can be achieved for lower level of legal hunting, negative 
externalities, such as poaching, could be understood as better internalized and, thus, a more 
preferable economically-based system for the management and utilization of wildlife appears. 
In accordance with Fisher et al (2005) the CBNRM outcomes depend on economic incentives 
programme design, communal trade-offs between wildlife benefits and agricultural losses, 
and on how hunting licenses are set (i.e. central-local level interactions). 
 
Based on the model implications, the collusive equilibrium seems more desirable both from 
an economic incentives perspective, but also from a wildlife conservation perspective. Yet, as 
addressed in the introduction, a policy-implementation also results from negotiation, lobbying 
and log rolling among groups with various agendas. Despite great success in terms of 
increased wildlife number following the economic incentive approach, the model implications 
suggests conservation incentives to be even better realized if the implemented CBNRM policy 
in Namibia could re-establish the intended policy design.  
 
Notably, the CBNRM policy and legislation is still under development. Therefore the results 
from the study should not be interpreted as a critic of the economic incentive regime as such. 
Rather it should be viewed as a contribution for further development and success. The 
wildlife management in Namibia is, and should continue to be, a prototype for thriving 
wildlife management approaches. This is a policy area where southern African countries 
should be vied as nothing else but booming pioneers and forerunners for future natural 
resources management. 
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Appendix 1: Map of Namibia  
 
 
 
 
Source: World Resources (2005) 
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Appendix 2: The CBNRM Policy and Legislation12   
 
 
Wildlife Management, Utilisation and Tourism in Communal Area Policy of 
1995 (i.e. the CBNRM policy) 
 
The policy objectives are as follows: 
 
i)   To establish an economically-based system for the management and utilization of wildlife 
and other renewable living resources on communal land so that rural communities can: 
• participate on a partnership basis with the Ministry of Environment and Tourism 
(MET) and other Ministries in the management of, and benefits from, natural 
resources; 
• benefit from rural development based on wildlife, tourism and other natural resource 
management; and 
• improve the conservation of natural resources by wise and sustainable resource 
management and the protection of biodiversity.  
 
ii)   To redress the past discriminatory policies and practices which gave substantial rights 
over wildlife to commercial farmers, but witch ignored communal farmers. 
 
iii)  To amend the Nature Conservation Ordinance of 1975 so that same principles that govern 
rights to wildlife utilization on commercial land are extended to communal land.  
 
iv)  To allow rural communities on state land to undertake tourism ventures, and to enter into 
cooperative agreements with commercial tourism organizations to develop tourism 
activities on state land. 
 
The policy states: 
• The right to utilize and benefit from wildlife on communal land should be developed 
to a rural community that forms a conservancy in terms of the Ministry’s policy on the 
conservancies.  
• Each conservancy should have the right to utilize wildlife within the bounds of the 
conservancy to the benefit of the community. Once a quota for each available species 
has been set, the conservancy members may decide how these animals may be 
utilized. They may decide to allow hunting by members of the conservancy, culling of 
game for meat, the sale of animals for trophy hunting, or the live sale of game. 
• The conservancy should be able to enter into business arrangement with private 
companies to carry out some or all of these activities. 
• The conservancy would also have the right to establish tourism facilities within 
boundaries or engage in a commercial arrangement with registered tourism operator to 
act on its behalf. 
 
 
 
                                                          
12 MET (1995) cited in Long (2004) 
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 Nature Conservation Amendment Act (i.e. the CBNRM legislation) 
 
To match the rights over wildlife between residents on communal land to the ones enjoyed by 
private land owners, the Nature Conservations Amendment Act amends the Nature 
Conservation Ordinance from 1975.  
 
The act provides legal provision for any group of persons residing on communal land to have, 
upon permission from the MET, the area they inhabit, declared a conservancy. The Minister is 
to declare a conservancy in the Government Gazette if: 
 
• the applying community have provided the MET with the names of the elected 
representative committee listed. 
• the conservancy boundaries are decided and agreed upon.  
• the applying conservancy area is not subject to any lease or proclaimed a game or 
nature reserve. 
• the community comply with to the legal constitution requiring sustainable 
management and utilization of game in the conservancy. 
• the conservancy committee has the capacity to manage funds 
• the conservancy committee has an appropriate method for equitable benefit 
distribution derived from consumptive and non-consumptive use of wildlife. 
 
If the requirements are met the act confers on the conservancy committee similar rights, 
privileges, duties, and obligations that the Nature Conservation Ordinance from 1975 confers 
on commercial farmers.  
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Appendix 3: The CBNRM Policy and Legislation 
 
The first order condition reads: 
 
0)()())(()())(( =′−′⋅−−′−′⋅−−′−=′ ACAQAQHWTAQAQHWRU β  (A3) 
 
Differentiated again with respect to A : 
 
[ ] [ ]
)()())((
2)())(()())((2)())((
ACAQAQHWT
AQAQHWTAQAQHWRAQAQHWRU
′′−′′⋅−−′−
′⋅−−′′+′′⋅−−′−′⋅−−′′+=′′
β
β
 
Excluding the arguments gives 
 
0<′′−′′′−′⋅′′′+′′′−′⋅′′′=′′ ACQTQQTQRQQRU ββ  
 
To ensure Equation (8) to yield a maximum utility (rather than a minimum), the above 
expression must be negative. The expression is here called −Δ . 
 
A total differentiation of (A3) gives; 
 
0)( =′⋅′−⋅′′′+′′+Δ ββ dQTdHQTRdA  
 
an expression equivalent to Equation (10).  
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